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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Cody Sellers appeals from his judgment of conviction for five counts of 
injury to a child. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Sellers with five counts of injury to a child with a great 
bodily injury enhancement.  (R., vol. I, pp. 106-10.)  The gravamen of the 
offenses were that on four different days Sellers “inflict[ed] unjustifiable physical 
pain or mental suffering by an act or acts of physical force” which caused the 
two-year-old victim to “sustain an abusive head injury” (Counts I-III, V) and on the 
fourth day also did “willfully cause or permit the child to be placed in a situation 
endangering her health or person, by failing to obtain medical attention” (Count 
IV).  (R., vol. I, pp. 108-09.) 
 Prior to trial the district court proffered jury instructions and heard 
objections.  (Tr., vol. I, p. 108, L. 10 – p. 112, L. 12.)  Prior to trial there was no 
objection to the court’s proposed elements instructions.  (Id.)  After the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on all five counts the district court submitted the great 
bodily injury enhancement to the jury.  (Tr., vol. III, p. 1649, L. 10 – p. 1652, L. 
17; R., vol. II, pp. 340-41, 352.)  Immediately after the jury retired to consider the 
enhancement, Sellers’ trial counsel moved to have his client acquitted of the 
felonies and deemed convicted of five misdemeanors because the instructions 
omitted the element differentiating misdemeanor and felony injury to a child.  (Tr., 
vol. III, p. 1653, L. 6 – p. 1655, L. 9.)  After hearing arguments from both sides, 
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the district court denied the request for acquittal and instead brought the jury 
back into court, instructed them on the missing element, and had them find 
Sellers guilty or not guilty of that element.  (Tr., vol. III, p. 1656, L. 3 – p. 1673, L. 
12; R., vol. II, pp. 327, 342-43.)  The jury found Sellers guilty of that element on 
four of the five charges (finding him not guilty of the element on Count III).  (R., 
vol. II, pp. 342-43.)  The jury ultimately found Sellers guilty of the great bodily 
injury enhancement as well.  (R., vol. II, p. 344.) 
 After trial, Sellers filed a motion for a new trial.  (R., vol. II, pp. 359-63.)  
The district court denied the motion because it failed to raise any issue allowed 
by the statute governing new trials.  (R., vol. III, pp. 434-54.) 
 At sentencing, the district court imposed concurrent sentences of one year 
for the misdemeanor (Count III), 10 years with five years fixed on the non-
enhanced felonies (Counts I, II and IV), and 25 years with 10 years determinate 
on the enhanced felony (Count V).  (R., vol. III, pp. 429-33.)  Sellers filed a timely 
notice of appeal.  (R., vol. III, pp. 455-58.)  
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ISSUES 
 
 Sellers states the issues on appeal as: 
1. “[T]he trial court incorrectly instructed the jury as to the elements of the 
charged offenses and exacerbated the issue in attempting to correct the 
instructions.” 
 
2. “Sellers argues that the misdemeanor conviction entered by the trial on 
Count III was not appropriately before the jury, nor were all the elements 
in Idaho Code § 18-1501(2) proven beyond a reasonable doubt as 
required by Idaho law.” 
 
3. “Sellers argues that the trial court erred in allowing Counts IV and V to be 
tried separately [sic—the counts were tried in the same trial] as they were 
part of a single criminal episode, thus violating constitutional double 
jeopardy protections.” 
 
4. “Sellers argues that the trial court improperly denied motions for cause to 
remove biased jurors.” 
 
5. “Sellers asks the Court to correct the illegal sentencing issues raised as to 
Counts III, IV, and V.” 
 
6. “Sellers also argues that the sentence for the convictions were unduly 
harsh given the circumstances.” 
 
7. “Sellers argues that even if not all of the above errors were prejudicial, 
combined, the errors denied Sellers due process ….”  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 1 (issues extracted from longer statements).) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Sellers failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it 
submitted an element originally omitted from the jury instruction for 
deliberations instead of declaring a mistrial? 
 
2. Has Sellers waived his claim that it was error to enter a judgment on his 
misdemeanor conviction because it is not supported with cogent argument 
or applicable legal authority? 
 
3. Has Sellers failed to show the district court erred by concluding that Count 
IV (charging neglect for failing to obtain medical help for the victim) and 
Count V (for physically abusing the victim and inflicting a head injury) were 
not the “same offense” for purposes of double jeopardy? 
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4. Has Sellers failed to show he was tried by a biased jury? 
 
5. Has Sellers failed to show an abuse of sentencing discretion? 
 
6. Has Sellers failed to show cumulative error because he has failed to show 
errors to cumulate? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Sellers Has Failed To Show That Bifurcation Of Jury Deliberations On The 
Elements Of The Charges Violated Any Right 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 After realizing that the elements instructions submitted to the jury did not 
include an element of the crime, and rejecting Sellers’ contention that he was 
entitled to acquittals on the felonies and entry of judgment on misdemeanors, the 
judge submitted additional instructions and a verdict form for the jury to 
deliberate and address the missing element.  (Tr., vol. III, p. 1653, L. 6 – p. 1673, 
L. 12; R., vol. II, pp. 327, 342-43.)  The jury found Sellers guilty on that element 
in four of the five counts.  (R., vol. II, pp. 342-43.) 
 On appeal, Sellers has abandoned the claim that the error in omitting an 
element of the crime from the instructions entitled him to an acquittal, and instead 
argues that the district court erred by not declaring a mistrial or otherwise 
granting a new trial after the error in the elements instructions was called to its 
attention.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 2-13.)  Thus, the parties agree that the elements 
instructions initially erroneously omitted a necessary element, but dispute only 
the adequacy and appropriateness of the remedy granted.  Because Sellers did 
not request a mistrial below, he must show that failing to grant him one sua 
sponte was fundamental error.  Application of the relevant law to the record 
shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion by correcting the error by 
instructing the jury to deliberate on and decide the omitted element, rather than 
grant a mistrial or a new trial. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The decision to declare a mistrial is within the discretion of the district 
court, and such a determination will only be reversed when that discretion has 
been abused.  State v. Talmage, 104 Idaho 249, 254, 658 P.2d 920, 925 (1983). 
 
C. Sellers Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error For Not Declaring A 
Mistrial 
 
 At trial, Sellers did not request a mistrial, but rather requested a 
termination of the trial with entry of convictions for misdemeanors.  (Tr., vol. III, p. 
1653, L. 6 – p. 1655, L. 9.)  His argument on appeal that he should have been 
granted a mistrial or a new trial was not preserved by a timely objection.1   
Claims of error not preserved by timely objection are reviewed using a 
three-part test: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
                                            
1 Sellers later moved for a new trial claiming it was error for the court to submit 
the omitted element to the jury after it had returned its first verdict.  (R., vol. II, pp. 
362-63.)  The district court denied the motion, reaching the merits.  (R., vol. III, 
pp. 447-53.)  The state submits that because Sellers did not request a mistrial, 
and requested the remedy of a second trial only after the first trial was completed 
in a manner unsatisfactory to him, he failed to assert a timely objection and 
therefore must show fundamental error.  It is the state’s position that he has 
failed to show error under any standard, fundamental or otherwise. 
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State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).  Application of this 
test shows no fundamental error. 
 First, Sellers has not provided any authority that there is a constitutionally 
required remedy for the omission of an element in jury instructions.  He has thus 
failed to show clear constitutional error in the remedy of having the undischarged 
trial jury deliberate the omitted element.  Second, it is quite clear from the record 
that Sellers’ trial counsel tactically timed his objection and requested remedy of a 
conviction on misdemeanors.  Thus, not moving for a mistrial was a tactical 
decision.  Finally, Sellers has failed to show that not simultaneously considering 
all the elements changed the outcome of the jury’s decisions.  Sellers’ argument 
that the jury entered into consideration of that last element having already 
concluded the other elements had been proven is not legitimate because the 
conclusion that the other elements had been proven was based on the evidence 
provided at trial.  There is no plausible theory that the order in which the jury 
considered the elements changed the jury’s weighing of the evidence.  Sellers’ 
has therefore failed to show prejudice on the record.2 
                                            
2 Sellers’ claim also fails if the claim was preserved. He has simply failed to show 
that bifurcating consideration of the elements violated due process or was 
otherwise error.  Even if it was error, the error was necessarily harmless because 
the Court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the bifurcation of 
deliberations did not change the jury’s view of what the evidence proved.  I.C.R. 
52 (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded.”); State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140, 334 P.3d 806, 
814 (2014) (“To establish harmless error, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.”). 
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 Sellers did not by timely objection preserve the claim that the proper 
remedy for omission of an element of the crime was to declare a mistrial or 
otherwise grant a new trial, and that the remedy provided—submitting the 
omitted element to the jury for consideration—was error.  He thus has the 
appellate burden of showing fundamental error on the face of the record.  On 
appeal he has failed to show any element of the fundamental error test.  
Therefore, he has failed to show reversible error. 
 
II. 
Sellers Has Waived His Claim That It Was Error To Enter A Judgment On His 
Misdemeanor Conviction Because It Is Not Supported With Cogent Argument Or 
Applicable Legal Authority 
 
 The jury convicted Sellers on Count III of the elements constituting 
misdemeanor injury to a child, but acquitted him of the element that would have 
made the crime a felony.  (R., vol. II, pp. 340, 342.)  The district court thereafter 
entered judgment on Count III as a misdemeanor.  (R., vol. III, p. 430.)  On 
appeal Sellers argues that entering judgment on misdemeanor injury to a child 
after the jury found him guilty of the elements of misdemeanor injury to a child 
was fundamental error.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-15.)  It is well settled, however, 
that the appellate courts of Idaho “will not consider an issue which is not 
supported by cogent argument and authority.”  In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 109, 
320 P.3d 1262, 1268 (2014) (internal quotations omitted).  Because Sellers’ 
argument is unsupported by cogent argument or relevant authority, it is not 
properly before this Court for consideration on appeal.   
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III. 
The Act Of Injuring The Victim And The Omission Of Securing Medical Care For 
The Victim Are Not The “Same Offense” For Purposes Of Double Jeopardy 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Count V of the information charged Sellers with inflicting “physical pain or 
mental suffering by an act or acts of physical force” causing “an abusive head 
injury.”  (R., vol. I, p. 109.)  Count IV charged Sellers with causing or permitting 
the child to be in a situation endangering her health or person “by failing to obtain 
health care.”  (Id.)  Prior to trial, Sellers moved to dismiss either Count IV or 
Count V because infliction of injuries and then failing to get medical help for 
those injuries  “appear to be part of a singular [sic] episode or continuing event.”  
(R., vol. I, pp. 128-33.)  The district court denied the motion.  (R., vol. I, pp. 177-
80.)  
 On appeal Sellers argues the district court erred because the two offenses 
arose out of the “same criminal episode.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-22.)  
Application of the law to the record in this case shows no error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review. 
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000). 
 
 10 
 
C. Sellers Has Failed To Show Legislative Intent That He Be Punished Only 
Once For Both Injuring A Child And Then Neglecting That Child 
 
 The United States Constitution prevents more than one jeopardy “for the 
same offense.”  U.S. Const., amend. V.  The main protection of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is “to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards 
of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.”  Burks v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (internal quotations omitted).  It also, 
however, “protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.”  North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).   
“With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from 
prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.”  Missouri v. 
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 365 (1983).  See also Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 
381 (1989) (“in the multiple punishments context” the interest protected by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause is “limited to ensuring that the total punishment did not 
exceed that authorized by the legislature”) (internal quotations omitted)).  To 
determine legislative intent: 
“The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction 
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to 
be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, 
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other 
does not.” 
 
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 337 (1981) (quoting Blockburger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).   
 Counts IV and V did not charge the “same offense” or create a risk of 
punishment beyond that authorized by the legislature.  First, they did not charge 
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the “same act or transaction.”  Count IV charged neglect for failing to obtain 
needed medical care.  Count V charged abuse for inflicting a head injury.  
Because the two counts charge entirely different acts (or, more accurately, 
charge an act constituting abuse and a different omission constituting neglect) 
they are not the same or included offenses.  Because the underlying act and 
omission are not the same “act or transaction,” there is no plausible ground for 
concluding they are the “same offense” and that the legislature intended only one 
punishment for a defendant who commits an act of abuse on a child, causing an 
injury, and then neglects a child by not getting necessary medical care. 
Second, even if both counts had arisen from the “same act or transaction,” 
each requires proof of a fact the other does not and is therefore not the “same 
offense” for purposes of double jeopardy.  To prove Count V the state had to 
prove that Sellers “inflict[ed] … unjustifiable pain or mental suffering.”  I.C. § 18-
1501(1).  To prove Count IV the state had to prove Sellers, having care or 
custody of the child, “caus[ed] or permit[ted] [the] child to be placed in such 
situation that its person or health is endangered.”  I.C. § 18-1501(1).  To prove 
the former did not require proof of the latter, and vice-versa.  If these crimes had 
been committed by different people instead of the same person, there is no doubt 
that proof of one’s guilt would not establish the other’s guilt as well. This is so 
because each requires proof of a fact not required to prove the other.  Because 
the legislature has required proof of different facts for abuse and neglect, 
application of the Blockburger test requires the conclusion that abuse and 
neglect are not the “same offense” for purposes of double jeopardy. 
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Application of the relevant legal standards shows that punishing Sellers for 
injuring the victim and also punishing him for neglecting the victim by failing to 
obtain medical care for her injuries did not impose greater punishment than the 
legislature intended.  The district court correctly concluded that mere temporal 
proximity did not render the charged crimes, one addressing an affirmative act 
and the other a criminal failure to act, the “same crime” for double punishment 
purposes. 
Sellers argues that Count IV and Count V charged the “same offense” 
because they both arose out of the “same criminal episode.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 17-19.)  For this proposition he relies on State v. Moffat, 154 Idaho 529, 300 
P.3d 61 (Ct. App. 2013).  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-19.)  Review of that opinion 
refutes Sellers’ argument. 
During a dispute with his girlfriend, Moffat “grabbed her by the hair, 
grabbed her around the throat, threw her around the room, pushed her into 
objects, and pushed her to the ground.”  Moffat, 154 Idaho at 530, 300 P.3d at 
62.  The state charged Moffat with misdemeanor domestic battery by citation, 
and later charged him with felony attempted strangulation.  Id.  He pled guilty to 
the misdemeanor and moved to dismiss the felony.  Id. 
In deciding whether double jeopardy barred the second prosecution the 
Court of Appeals applied a two-step analysis.  First, it reviewed whether both 
crimes contained an element not found in the other, determined that 
strangulation was a form of battery, and concluded that although the 
strangulation charge contained an element not found in the battery charge, the 
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battery charge contained no additional element not found in the strangulation 
charge.  Id. at 530-32, 300 P.3d at 62-64.  Thus, review of the elements showed 
domestic battery was a lesser included offense of attempted strangulation.  Id.  
Second, it made “the factual inquiry of whether Moffat’s crimes were part of one 
continuing event or transaction,” ultimately concluding they were.  Id. at 532-33, 
300 P.3d at 64-65.  Because the domestic battery, for which Moffat had already 
suffered jeopardy, was both legally and factually a lesser included offense of the 
charged attempted strangulation, Moffat could not be put at a second jeopardy 
on the attempted strangulation charge.  Id.3  
As set forth above, applying this two-part test shows no double jeopardy 
violation.  Because Count IV contains a neglect element not found in Count V, 
and Count V contains an abuse element not found in Count IV, these charges 
pass the elements test and are thus proper subjects of double punishment even 
if they arose out of the same act or transaction.  Moreover, as stated above, they 
also pass the “continuing event or transaction” test because the medical neglect 
                                            
3 The state submits that if Moffat had involved a single jeopardy instead of 
successive jeopardy, and thus limited the issue to only whether multiple 
convictions allowed greater punishment than the legislature intended, the 
outcome of that case would have been different.  Specifically, if in a single 
charging document the state had charged three counts of domestic battery—one 
for pulling hair, another count for pushing her into objects, and a third for pushing 
her to the floor—and a fourth count charging attempted strangulation for the 
strangulation, such would not have run afoul of legislative intent on punishment.  
See, e.g., State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 33 P.3d 218 (Ct. App. 2001) (evidence 
of other acts of violence against the victim during single attack not included 
offenses of charged offenses).  Because the issue in this case is not a second 
jeopardy but only double punishment—and therefore limited to determining what 
punishments the legislature intended—the proper analysis is even more limited 
than that used in Moffat.  
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was not merely a continuation of the physical abuse.  See, e.g., State v. Moad, 
156 Idaho 654, 330 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2014) (although battery with intent to 
commit rape normally merges into completed rape conviction, battery with intent 
to commit rape committed after successful rape is a new offense).  The analysis 
of Moffat does not assist Sellers because it does not show that punishing Sellers 
for both abusing and then neglecting the child exceeded the punishment 
authorized by the legislature. 
Sellers proposes reading Moffat so broadly as to incorporate two 
repudiated double jeopardy legal standards for a “single criminal episode” test.  
First, the legal standard proposed by Sellers is indistinguishable from the “one 
criminal episode” test proposed by Justice Brennan, but which never garnered 
support of more than three justices.  See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 
(1977) (concurring opinion espousing test requiring state to “join at one trial all 
the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, 
occurrence, episode, or transaction”); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 454 
(1970) (same); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 395-96 (1970).  The Supreme 
Court of the United States has consistently refused to adopt a “single criminal 
episode” test: “We have steadfastly refused to adopt the ‘single transaction’ view 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”  Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790 
(1985) (rejecting an argument for Justice Brennan’s test).   
 The importance of the rejection of this standard is demonstrated by Morris 
v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986).  Mathews was involved in a robbery where his 
partner was shot to death while the two men tried to avoid capture.  Id. at 238-39.  
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Because the coroner initially ruled the death a suicide, the state charged 
Mathews with aggravated robbery but not murder, and he pled guilty.  Id. at 239-
40.  When additional evidence showing that the partner had been murdered 
came to light, the state charged Mathews with aggravated murder, and Mathews 
was convicted after a trial.  Id. at 240-42.  The Ohio appellate court concluded 
(on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States) that because the 
robbery was an element of the aggravated murder, double jeopardy prohibited 
the state from subjecting Mathews to a second jeopardy for aggravated murder.  
The court reduced the conviction from aggravated murder to murder, because 
the latter charge did not include participation in the robbery as an element.  Id. at 
242-43.   
The only issue addressed by the Supreme Court was “whether reducing 
respondent's conviction for aggravated murder to a conviction for murder is an 
adequate remedy for the double jeopardy violation.”  Id. at 245.  The Court held 
that “when a jeopardy-barred conviction is reduced to a conviction for a lesser 
included offense which is not jeopardy barred, the burden shifts to the defendant 
to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted 
of the nonjeopardy-barred offense absent the presence of the jeopardy-barred 
offense.”  Id. at 246-47. 
The significance of this is that Justice Brennan dissented, stating he 
“adhere[d] to [his] view that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires that except in 
extremely limited circumstances not present here, all the charges against a 
defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or 
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transaction be prosecuted in one proceeding” and barred any further legal 
proceedings arising out of the criminal episode.  Id. at 257 (Brennan, J. 
dissenting) (internal quotes omitted).  The rejection of Justice Brennan’s same 
episode or transaction test meant that, although double jeopardy barred a 
second jeopardy for the robbery, it did not bar jeopardy for the murder, even 
though both crimes arose from the same criminal episode.  Sellers’ advocacy for 
a “single criminal episode” test should be rejected as incompatible with Supreme 
Court precedent. 
The second rejected legal standard Sellers seeks to resurrect is the 
repealed Idaho statutory double jeopardy standard.  Idaho Code § 18-301, 
repealed in 1995, provided: 
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by 
different provisions of this code may be punished under either of 
such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than 
one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars 
a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other. 
 
This provision “constrain[ed] punishment or prosecution for different crimes 
based on the same conduct.”  State v. Lynch, 126 Idaho 388, 390, 883 P.2d 
1080, 1082 (1994) (holding that I.C. § 18-301 prohibited prosecution for both 
failure to maintain lane and DUI).   
The protection afforded by this statute is broader than that created 
by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. The Fifth Amendment prohibits double jeopardy for 
the “same offense,” while Section 18–301 proscribes double 
punishment or prosecution for the same “act or omission.” Thus, in 
the constitutional arena the inquiry is whether the charged crimes 
involve separate elements, whereas our inquiry under I.C. § 18–
301 is whether the charged crimes are based upon separate acts. 
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State v. Castaneda, 125 Idaho 234, 235, 869 P.2d 234, 235 (Ct. App. 1994).  
See also Lynch, 126 Idaho at 390, 883 P.2d at 1082.  The standard required by 
this repealed statute, which exceeded the scope of constitutional protections, is 
indistinguishable from the “single criminal episode” test proposed by Sellers: 
The applicability of section 301 depends upon whether a separate 
and distinct act can be established as the basis for each 
prosecution, regardless of whether the offenses require proof of 
differing elements.  The term “act,” as defined by the statute, refers 
to that term in its ordinary sense, but also includes a course of 
conduct of such a nature as to amount to a single act, that is, a 
course of conduct which does not consist of divisible transactions. 
Compare Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 
85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985) (rejecting a single-transaction test for 
purposes of applying former jeopardy protection contained in the 
fifth amendment). 
 
In determining whether a defendant's conduct is divisible into 
separate, distinct events, we employ a “temporal test”-a test of 
time. Under this test, if one of the offenses was completed prior to 
the commission of the second crime, then the two cannot be said to 
arise from the “same act,” and the provisions of section 18-301 do 
not apply.   
 
State v. Smith, 121 Idaho 20, 23-24, 822 P.2d 539, 542-43 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(footnotes and citations, with one exception, omitted, emphasis original).  Sellers’ 
attempt to resurrect the repealed extra-constitutional standard in I.C. § 18-301 
should be rejected. 
 Sellers next argues that the Idaho Constitution (unlike the Constitution of 
the United States) employs a “pleading theory” that he asserts should result in a 
finding of a double jeopardy violation because the abuse resulting in a head 
injury “was the means” by which the neglect for failing to obtain medical care was 
accomplished.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-20.)  This standard, however, is 
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completely incompatible with established double jeopardy law regarding multiple 
punishment.     
The standard applicable to multiple punishment claims under the federal 
constitution is clear: “With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single 
trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing 
court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.”  Hunter, 
459 U.S. at 365.  It is impossible to reconcile this standard with the “pleading 
theory.”  Clearly the prosecutor may not alter legislative intent by how he or she 
pleads a case.  The state submits that the “pleading theory” is inapposite to the 
relevant inquiry. 
If the Court applies the “pleading theory” it is clear the abuse was not the 
“means” by which Sellers accomplished the neglect, nor vice-versa.  See State v. 
Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 529, 261 P.3d 519, 523 (2011) (crime may be lesser 
included offense if it was the means by which the other crime was committed).  
Indeed, if one person committed the abuse of the victim and inflicted the head 
injury and another person with care or custody of the child neglected the victim 
and refused to get medical assistance, each would be independently guilty of 
separate and different crimes.  Neither crime was the “means” by which the other 
crime was committed. 
The crime of abusing the child and injuring her and the crime of neglecting 
her by failing to obtain needed medical care are separate crimes under any and 
all double jeopardy theories.  Sellers has therefore failed to show error in the 
denial of his motion to dismiss either Count IV or Count V. 
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IV. 
Sellers Has Failed To Show He Was Tried By A Biased Jury 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 During voir dire, one of the questions asked by the district court was 
whether any of the prospective jurors or their close family members had been a 
victim of child abuse.  (Tr., vol. I, p. 167, Ls. 19-22.)  Prospective juror number 10 
informed the court that her daughter had been physically abused by a babysitter 
36 years ago, and that her step-grandson had been physically abused by a 
stepfather.  (Tr., vol. I, p. 175, L. 17 – p. 176, L. 24; p. 178, Ls. 19-25.)  She 
stated that she would decide the case on the evidence and find the defendant not 
guilty if that was what the evidence indicated.  (Tr., vol. I, p. 177, Ls. 4-12, 22-
25.)  During the parties’ voir dire she acknowledged that child abuse was an “iffy 
subject” for her and the defense probably would not want her as a juror because 
of her experience, but reaffirmed that she would make any ultimate decision of 
guilt based on the evidence.  (Tr., vol. I, p. 179, L. 8 – p. 180, L. 25.)  Sellers 
challenged this juror for cause, but the district court accepted her statement that 
she would decide the case based on the evidence and rejected the challenge.  
(Tr., vol. I, p. 208, L. 14 – p. 210, L. 12.) 
 The district court also asked whether the prospective jurors knew the 
prosecutor.  (Tr., vol. I, p. 153, L. 25 – p. 154, L. 8.)  Prospective juror number 20 
indicated in the positive and stated he trusted the prosecutor’s judgments, but 
also stated that he could decide the case based only on the evidence.  (Tr., vol. I, 
p. 154, L. 11 – p. 155, L. 1.)  Sellers also challenged this potential juror for cause, 
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but the district court denied the challenge.  (Tr., vol. I, p. 251, L. 17 – p. 253, L. 
10; p. 345, L. 7 – p. 346, L. 11.) 
 The parties excused 16 potential jurors using peremptory challenges, 
including potential juror 20 but not potential juror 10, who sat on the jury.  (Tr., 
vol. I, p. 346, L. 19 – p. 348, L. 4; R., vol. II, pp. 349-50.)   
 On appeal Sellers claims error in the district court’s denial of his for-cause 
challenges to potential jurors 10 and 20.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-31.)  He has 
failed to show error because the district court was within its discretion to accept 
the potential jurors’ representations that they would decide the case based on the 
evidence.  Moreover, he has failed to show error in relation to potential juror 20 
because he did not sit as a juror and therefore could not have caused the jury to 
be biased. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The determination whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict 
is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed 
absent a showing of abuse of discretion.”  State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 609, 
150 P.3d 296, 302 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). 
 
C. Sellers Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
Because The Potential Jurors Both Stated They Could Decide The Case 
Based On The Evidence 
 
“A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury.”  
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011) (citing U.S. Const., 
amends. V, VI, XIV; Idaho Const. art. 1, §§ 7, 13).  Unless a prospective juror 
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indicates an inability to “lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented in court,” it is presumed the prospective juror is 
impartial.  Id. (quoting State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 506, 988 P.2d 1170, 
1180 (1999)).  As explained by the United States Supreme Court: 
[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross 
section of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of 
individual viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as 
the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn 
duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case. 
 
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 
U.S. 162, 184 (1986)).  Consistent with these principles, “a trial court does not 
abuse its discretion by refusing to excuse for cause jurors whose answers during 
voir dire initially give rise to challenges for cause but who later assure the court 
that they will be able to remain fair and impartial.”  Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 
138, 141, 937 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1997), quoted in Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 
Idaho 347, 353, 256 P.3d 755, 761 (2011); see also Ellington, 151 Idaho at 70, 
253 P.3d at 744 (citation omitted) (“Although not always dispositive, the trial 
judge is entitled to rely on assurances from venire persons concerning partiality 
or bias.”).  In addition, where “a party uses one of its peremptory challenges to 
remove a juror it argues should have been removed for cause, the party must 
show on appeal that ‘he was prejudiced by being required to use a peremptory 
challenge to remove the juror.’”  Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 354, 256 P.3d at 762 
(quoting State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 570, 808 P.2d 1313, 1315 (1991)) 
(brackets omitted). 
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 The record in this case shows that both challenged jurors represented to 
the district court that they could decide the case based on the evidence.  (Tr., vol. 
I, p. 154, L. 17 – p. 155, L. 1; p. 177, Ls. 4-12, 22-25; p. 180, Ls. 10-25; p. 345, L. 
19 – p. 346, L. 9.)  In both instances the district court accepted those 
representations.  (Tr., vol. I, p. 210, Ls. 6-12; p. 253, Ls. 4-10; p. 345, L. 19 – p. 
346, L. 11.)  Moreover, potential juror 20 did not sit on the jury.  (Tr., vol. I, p. 
346, L. 19 – p. 348, L. 4; R., vol. II, pp. 349-50.)  The record does not support an 
abuse of discretion by the district court under the applicable law. 
 Relying on State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 348 P.3d 1 (2015), Sellers 
claims that, after “admit[ting] bias” potential juror 10 gave “no unequivocal 
assurance of the ability to be impartial despite several efforts by the court or 
counsel to elicit such assurance.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 27-28.)  This argument 
is unsupported in the record. 
 First, the juror did not admit bias.  She conveyed that two of her family 
members had been physically abused as children.  At no time did she state that 
her experience would cause her to be biased against the defendant.  Moreover, 
every time she was asked whether she could decide the case based on the 
evidence, including acquitting the defendant if the evidence did not prove his 
guilt, she stated she could.  (Tr., vol. I, p. 177, Ls. 9-25; p. 180, Ls. 10-25.)  Even 
Sellers’ trial counsel found eight potential jurors he wanted on the jury less than 
juror 10 and excused them with peremptory challenges.  This strongly indicates 
that Sellers’ trial counsel had confidence in potential juror 10’s representation she 
would render a verdict based on the evidence.  
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Actual bias is “‘the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in 
reference to the case, or to either of the parties, which, in the exercise of a sound 
discretion on the part of the trier, leads to the inference that he will not act with 
entire impartiality.’”  Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 421-22, 348 P.3d at 36-37 (quoting 
I.C. § 19-2019(2)).  The mere fact the juror had a child and grandchild who were 
physically abused did not alone show actual bias.  Moreover, even a potential 
juror who has expressed bias need not be excused “if the juror can lay aside his 
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in 
court.”  Id. at 422, 348 P.3d at 37 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
Here the juror repeatedly stated she could render a verdict on the evidence 
presented in court.  Thus, Sellers has failed to show any abuse of discretion. 
Sellers next argues that failing to excuse potential juror 20 for cause made 
his jury unfair because potential juror 10 was on it.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 28-30.)  
This argument is meritless.  Sellers has failed to show that having potential juror 
10 sit on the case rendered his jury biased.  If he had shown that having potential 
juror 10 on the jury rendered it biased he is entitled to a new trial.  In neither case 
would the ruling on the motion to excuse juror 20 for cause be relevant. 
The district court rejected the motion to excuse for cause prospective juror 
10 after she repeatedly stated she could lay aside her impression or opinion and 
render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.  The record shows no 
abuse of discretion.   
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V. 
Sellers Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion 
 
 For the conviction on Count V, injury to a child enhanced by the great 
bodily harm enhancement, the district court imposed a sentence of 25 years with 
10 years determinate.  (R., vol. III, p. 432.)  For the other convictions the district 
court imposed shorter, concurrent sentences.  (R., vol. III, pp. 430-32.)  In 
imposing these sentences the district court considered the jury’s finding of guilt, 
mitigating factors such as lack of any criminal history and support of family and 
friends, applied the relevant legal standards, and concluded that the seriousness 
of the crime required the substantial sentence it was imposing.  (Tr., vol. III, p. 
1845, L. 11 – p. 1860, L. 19.) 
 “Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”  State v. 
Anderson, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. 
Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)).  Where a sentence is within 
statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish that the sentence is a clear 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 
(2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  To carry 
this burden, the appellant must show that his sentence is excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A 
sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary objective of 
protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, 
rehabilitation, or retribution.  State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 
730 (1978).  The Court reviews the whole sentence on appeal and presumes that 
the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of 
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confinement.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).  In 
deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable 
sentence where reasonable minds might differ.  State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 
568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
 Sellers contends the district court abused its discretion citing the same 
considerations specifically articulated and addressed by the district court at 
sentencing, such as the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, his lack of history, 
and family support.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-23.)  Because the district court 
specifically considered all such factors Sellers’ argument fails.  Sellers also 
argues that his sentence should be based on the median sentence for all injury to 
child cases.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 23.)  This argument fails as a matter of law, 
because comparative sentencing is not an appropriate standard.  See State v. 
Pederson, 124 Idaho 179, 183, 857 P.2d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 1993) (“It is well 
settled that not every offense in like category calls for identical punishment; there 
may properly be a variation in sentences between different offenders, depending 
on the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant in his or 
her individual case.”  (Citations omitted.)).  It also fails factually because Sellers 
ignores the enhancement he was convicted of and has not shown that half of the 
defendants convicted of injury to a child deserved a sentence longer than his. 
 The sentences imposed by the district court are appropriate considering 
the facts of the crime and the character of the offender.  Sellers has failed to 
show any abuse of sentencing discretion. 
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VI. 
Sellers Failed To Show Cumulative Error  
 
 Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.  State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994).  A necessary predicate 
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.  
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition, 
cumulative error analysis does not include errors not objected to unless those 
errors are found to be fundamental.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982.  
As set forth above, Sellers has failed to show any error or fundamental error.  
There are, therefore, no errors to cumulate. 
 Moreover, Sellers has failed to present a viable theory of cumulative error.  
One of the errors he claims is a double jeopardy violation for double punishment.  
If Sellers were correct, and Count IV was a lesser included offense of Count V, it 
was not error to try both the lesser and the greater included offenses in the same 
trial. His remedy would not be a new trial, but instead a merger of the two 
convictions and sentences.  Even if Sellers were correct on his claim that Count 
IV and V were the same offense (which he is not) such could not have caused 
any trial prejudice to cumulate. 
 In addition, his claim of a biased jury is incompatible with cumulative error 
review.  If the jury was biased, the error could not be harmless.  Because the 
cumulative error doctrine cumulates only harmless error, inclusion of this claim of 
error in the cumulative error analysis is logically impossible.   
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 The only alleged error Sellers has asserted that could even potentially be 
found harmless is Sellers’ claim of instructional error.  Because only one error 
could be held harmless and is therefore even theoretically subject to analysis 
under the cumulative error rule, there is no potentially viable claim that there are 
two errors to cumulate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s 
judgment of conviction. 
 DATED this 25th day of April, 2016. 
 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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